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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MILTON WINN,

Appellant,
Case
No. 8575

-vs.-

WILLIAM B. REID,

Respondent.

Respondent's Brief
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The Respondent accepts the Appellant's statement
of the facts except that Respondent throughout the brief,
will at more appropriate times add to, and supplement
said Appellant's statement.

POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT ONE
THAT THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN
FINDING THE PLAINTIFF (APPELLANT) NEGLIGENT AND THAT SUCH NEGLIGENCE PROXIMATELY
CAUSED OR CONTRIBUTED TO THE APPELLANT'S
INJURIES.
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POINT TWO
THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN FINDING
THAT THE APPELLANT WAS NEGLIGENT AND IN
VIOLATION OF LAW, AND PARTICULARLY FOR THE
REASON SAID PLAINTIFF WAS RIDING AND DIRECTING IDS HORSE ON THE LEFT SIDE OF THE IDGHWAY, TRAVELING AGAINST AND TOWARD ONCOMING TRAFFIC AND THAT PERSONS RIDING HORSEBACK ARE SUBJECT TO THE SAME RULES ON THE
HIGHWAY, SO FAR AS IS POSSIBLE, AS VEHICULAR
TRAFFIC AND THAT THE APPELLANT PROXIMATELY CAUSED OR CONTRIBUTED TO HIS OWN INJURY J
BY SO RIDING AND DRIVING ON THE IDGHWAY.
I
!

ARGU~IENT

POINTS ONE and TWO

The Court made findings that the :
''Plaintiff caused his horse to move from the
right hand side of the road to the left hand side
of the road, and had straightened out and proceeded parallel with the road for about 30 rods
when the accident occurred. That the Defendant
operated his car into and against the rear end of
the horse ... the Plaintff directed his animal over
to the wrong side and along said left side ... "
The further findings merely sa~· the Plaintiff, his
horst' and the Defendant's vehicle were injured and
dnmaged, and that both the Plaintiff and Defendant
\H'rt' JIP~.dig-Pnt and that the negligence of each was the
proximate ca ust> of the n'snlting accident, injuries and
damngc.

It is appan'nt t11e Court intended to rule that a
horst> nnd rider using a. highway must usc the right side
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of the road the same as vehicular traffic and the Court
1~1 undoubtedly relied on Section 41-6-15, Utah Code Anno\lm tated, 1953, which section reads as follows:

Gtl
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t
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~~(

"41-6-15. PERSONS RIDING OR DRIVING
ANIMALS TO OBEY REGULATIONS.-Every
person riding an animal or driving any animaldrawn vehicle upon a roadway shall be subject
to the provisions of this act applicable to the
driver of a vehicle, except those provsions of this
act whch by their nature can have no application.''

The respondent feels that the Court was entirely
correct in holding the Appellant negligent and in violation of law for traveling on the left side of the highway.
The Appellant of course claims that a horse and rider
must travel in the left lane against traffic as required
of pedestrians, and that is one of the issues being presented to the Court.

Every person has a right to use the highway with
any means of travel he desires not prohibited by law.
1
"
Each traveler, regardless of the means being used, must
f
~ exercise ordinary care so as not to endanger or injure
themselves or others. (Butler vs. Cabe (Ark.), 171
1190-1.) In our Utah Motor Vehicle Code the legislature
has quite completely regulated all types of two to four
wheel vehicles whether motor driven or not. Our Code
" provides specially for pedestrians in Section 41-6-82 (b),
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, if of necessity they have to
use the highways. But under no pretense could it even
be suggested that this section applies to horses and
riders. Especially is this so when we note our legislature
specially classed all situations of horses being ridden or
:s

s."T·
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driven, with vehicles. This is in the Section 41-6-15
quoted above. Therefore, all persons' rights are equal
on the highway, subject of course to the statutory regn.
lations duly imposed by the legislature.
The Appellant on page 8 of his brief quotes our
Supreme Court in the case of Dalley vs. Midwestern
Dairy Products Company, 15 Pac. 2nd 309, as suggesting
that the trial court in this case was wrong merely becuase
the court said that men on horseback and in horse drawn
vehicles at that tinte were not required to disclose a light.
That is not our problem but may we point out that that
case was decided in 1932 and the section of law in issue
was passed in 1941.
The State of California (Sec. 452 in California
Vehicle Code) and the State of Oregon (Sec. 115-305
Ore. Comp. Laws) have identical statutes with Utah
except that they include bicycles with horses and use the
same conditions and restrictions. (See Sec. 275, Calif.
•Jurisprudence 2nd on .\.utomobiles.) :Jiany cases from
these two states repeat the rule that in nearly all requirements, like, using the right side of road, signaling, care
and many others, bicycles must be regulated by the same
rnlt>s as automobiles. It is to be noted that horseback
ridtlrs are in thl" same section of, and put in the same
~]ass h~·, the law. (St't' Finn· Ys. Beeshau (Calif.), 33
Pac. 2nd 1033; 17~ .A.L.R.. 736, 732, 733.) In the case of
\\'right n~. Sniffen (Calif.), 181 Pac. 2nd 675-77 the
( 1alifornia
Supreme Court in interpreting its statute,
Ht•ct ion 4;,~, which includes horses and bicycles without
distinguishing hc.•twcl'll them says that a "vehicle" is
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''that in or on which a person or thing is er may be
carried.''
The Respondent is unable to find a case actually in
point, but has found the following cases which we hope
will be helpful to the Court. We feel that they summarize
' the law into the following points:
1. A man on horseback is not a pedestrian and
should travel on the right side of the highway instead
of the left side.
2. Under the rule of reasonable caution and equal
rights on the highway a person riding a horse should be
controlled by, and be able to meet, any variance in the
many circumstances and situations that are possible so
· as to always act in the greatest of safety.
3. Horseback riders don't usually require lights,
but depending on the circumstances, such as light, darkness, curves, sight obstructions, etc., care should always
be exercised even if the rider had to use partially or
exclusively the right shoulder of the highway.
As indicated above, Oregon has a law similar to our
Utah law. In the case of Sertic vs. McCullough (Ore.),
63 Pac. 2nd 884, 887, we have a person walking and
leading two horses on the left side of ·the road. The
Court said that they would not find him contributorily
negligent merely because he was leading the horses on
the left side of the road. The Court said this Plaintiff
was a pedestrian, he was not riding a horse or in any
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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vehicle, therefore he didn't have to be on the right side
of the road. We realize it is not exactly in point but we
suggest it because it at least discusses the problem and
does make the point that only a pedestrian must travel
on the left side. This case is quoted and followed in
other later cases.
A very lengthy opinion, written in 1945, goes into
the problem in the case of Lawson vs. Fordyce (Iowa),
21 N.W. 2nd 69. This was a case of a person leading a
cow on the right side of the road. This court refused to
apply the pedestrian rule and said the person leading
the cow belonged on the right side. The Court's reasons
as to why are interesting. The Court said:
"(Pge. 83) . . . it is a matter of common
knowledge that the safest place for a pedestrian
to travel is near the extreme edge of the roadway
on his left side, for in that place he need not
watch the traffic from the rear and is facing the
oncoming traffic and can step to the left on the
shoulder to avoid it. . . . (Pge. 84) In the hypothetical situation we have suggested an unencumbered walker might escape by jumping to his
left, but a person leading a cow or other domstic
animal, or driving one, or driving a harnessed
but unhitched horse or team would \ery likely be
unsu('cessful in getting the frightened animal or
animals to jump with him. The result would
probahly be a ('atastrophe for all concerned. We
doubt n'rr mucl1 tlmt the legislatures of the
s tnt l~s men toned intended such statutory provisions to apply to pt'rsons on foot and in charge of
horses, ('OWS, and other livestock upon tl1e highwaYs .... (Pge. 8;)) (Pedestrians are those who
uw)· nst) the sidl'Walks, certainly animals are not
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allowed on sidewalks so the law for pedestrians
does not apply where a person in is charge of
animals.) So far as our research has disclased, no
court by dictum or decision has ever said, and
no text writer ... has ever interpreted these statutes as including a person on foot leading or
otherwise in charge of one or more cows, horses,
mules, hogs, sheep, etc. on the highway.''
The Respondent humbly submits that since the enactment of Section 41-6-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
in 1941, horseback riders must use the right side of the
highway along with vehicles. The law clearly so states
and even the use of that side must be done with care
depending on the circumstances even to the extent of
getting off onto the right shoulder when cars approach
and pass from the rear. The above cases submitted by
the Respondent also point out that all interpretations of
laws similar to our Utah law uphold the principle that
horseback riders must use the right hand side of the
road.
Even though there were certain points of conflict
in the evidence presented in, and, which had to be sorted
and resolved by the lower court, said Court had to make
a decision and findings and naturally thereby positively
rejected certain bits of evidence. The positive findings
included time and place and found that both the Appellant and the Respondent were riding and operating "on
the left hand side of the same road'' going in the same
direction. That the Appellant had travelled 30 rods on
the left side "when the accident occurred." BUT THE
COURT MADE NO SPECIFIC FINDINGS AS TO
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WHERE ON THE ROAD THE RESPONDENT HAD
BEEN TRAVELING EXCEPT TO SAY THAT HIS
CAR HAD BEEN GOING NORTH AND HIT THE
REAR END OF THE HORSE.
The Court then further found both Appellant and
Respondent negligent for both being on the wrong side
of the road and that the negligence of each was the
proximate cause of their own injuries and damage.
It is only natural to assume that the Court gave full
consideration and credance to any other testimony introduced at the trial, not specifically in conflict with the
above findings, and if the full picture of such testimony
could give to the court reasonable grounds for its findings, said findings of the Court and its decree should be
upheld and affirmed and no new trial granted. This
honorable Court has frequently held that even though
there be a conflict in the testimony, or even though this
Court might have held otherwise had they been the
Judge or Judges in the lower court, this Court cannot
disturb but must uphold the findings of the lower court
unless the lower court was clearly wrong and had no
<''·idence to support said findings.
~t't':

y owell n'. Oceidental Life Ins. Co., 110 Pac. 2nd

566-1: 100 Ptah

1~0.

Bear Hin'r ~tnk Bank Ys. l\Ierrill, 120 Pac. 2nd
:~~;-)-7: 101 Utah 176.
Ercanbrack n:. Ellison, 134 Par. 2nd 177-8: 103
lTtab 138.
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Palfreyman vs. Bates and Rogers, 158 Pac. 2nd
315-23; 119 Utah 529.
Garrett Freight Lines vs. Cornwall, 232 Pac. 2nd
786-9; 120 Utah 175.
'I

~·

); ~

Douglas vs. Duvall, 304 Pac. 2nd 373-4; 5 Utah
2nd 429.
Respondent submits and repeats that the lower
court doesn't presume in the least way to find or establish through its findings the details of how or where the
accident occurred. We again refer to the Court's findings above. These findings are very general and certainly must be leaving the details to the record. Respondent submits that there is great conflict in this case as
to the claims being made but there is no conflict in the
ultimate details of this accident. About the only important point of conflict in the testimony of the two parties
is the point at which the Appellant caused his horse to
cross over the highway. Respondent's testimony was to
the effect that the horse crossed over just prior to the
accident. (R. 73-74). This theory was apparently rejected by the Court but in the other important details
Respondent claims there is no serious conflict.
~lay we briefly point out to the Court the details

back of the Court's general findings. PLEASE NOTE
THAT ALL THE FOLLOWING FACTS COME EXCLUSIVELY FROM THE TESTIMONY OF Tl!E
APPELLANT'S OWN WITNESSES. The Appellant
was riding a brown horse (R. 27). The accident happened after sundown, just at dusk, and the Respondent
had the lights on his car (R. 47, 48, 73). The ResponSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

dent's car came to rest at a 22.5 degree angle in the
west lane headed in a northwest direction, the left front
wheel being six inches, and the left rear wheel being four
feet from the west edge of the hard surface of the highway (R. 48, 49). The Respondent's right front wheel
was one to two feet from the center line (R. 43). The
Respondent skidded and left tire marks of 48 feet beginning from a point where the marks about straddled
the center line and headed generally in a northwest direction to the point above indicated (R. 40, 42). The tracks
were measured from the rear end where the tracks of
the rear wheels started, to the front end where the tracks
of the front wheels ended. The Respondent's car had
four wheel brakes and measured 10% feet between the
wheels thereby cutting the actual skid to about 38 feet
(R. 79 to 89). That the point of impact set by the dirt,
debris and glass was at a point at and under the rear
end of the car as it stood when the right rear wheel was
four feet from the west edge of the road. This would
place the point of impact abou-t six feet east of th.e 1rest
cd.Qf' nf the road (R. 49, lines 5-6). This cannot be disputed, it is the testimony of the Appellant's own witness,
and it is in absolute harmony with all the other testimony
of the Appellant's witnesses and was beyond doubt
arrepted hy the Court. Therefore, it appears that we
find the R-espondent., after he discovers his peril and puts
on hi~ hrakt'S, skidding 38 ftlet from the east lane to the
wPst laJH' to u,·oid some peril and it must haYe been the
Appellant's horse because our collision was with the
Appellant's horsl' in the west lane six feet from the west
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edge of the road. This is undisputed and the Court made
no finding contrary to it.
Therefore, looking at all the evidence of the case the
lower Court must have accepted the fact that the Respondent was driving northward just prior to the accident, at least substantially in his own lane of traffic.
The indisputable physical facts put the Respondent in
said lane, the Court made no contrary findings and
couldn't be disputed by the Court. The i.ndisputable facts
are that the Respondent was confronted by a sudden
peril and skidded at least 38 feet into the Appellant and
his horse. The Respondent gave an absolutely consistent
reason for those skid marks by maintaining and testifying that the horse appeared suddenly before him crossing from the east to the west (R. 73, 74), and Respondent
tried to avoid hitting the horse by veering to his left
and putting on his brakes. The Court rejected the portion of the evidence that the horse crossed over the highway from the east but the Court made no findings denouncing, amending or rejecting the physical facts of
the Respondent skidding diagonally from the east to the
west side of the highway. The only finding of the Court
was that the Respondent was on the west and wrong side
of the road with his automobile "without just cause or
excuse." So ultimately we find both the Appellant and
Respondent on the wrong side of the road. The Court
finds them both wrong in being there. Apparently the
Court felt the Appellant was there by deliberate action
and the Respondent got there because of some sudden
action or peril which caused the said Respondent to veer
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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his car to the wrong side of the highway. Under these
circumstances both would have to be wrong. One couldn't
be negligent and the other not.
THESE FACTS PUT BOTH PARTIES ON THE
WRONG SIDE OF THE ROAD, BOTH NEGLIGENT
OR IN VIOLATION OF LAW, AND CERTAINLY
BOTH SUPPLYING OR CONTRIBUTING TO THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF BOTH THEffi INJURIES
AND LOSSES. CERTAINLY IF THE APPELLANT
HAD BEEN COMPLYING WITH THE LAW THE
ACCIDENT WOULD NEVER HAVE HAPPENED.
If the Appellant had been on the hard surface on
his side the undisputed evidence is that the Respondent
in moving to the left would have avoided the accident
and certainly if the Appellant had been on the right
shoulder of the admitted six feet width there would have
been no accident.
CONCLUSION
The Respondent submits that:
The Appellant was violating the law by riding
his horsP on the left side of the highway.
1.

2.

This violation wns the proximate cause of the
Appellant·~ injuries and losses.
~-

IIad tlw Appellant been complying with the law
he would han• received no injuries or losses.
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4. For these reasons the judgment of the lower
Court should be affirmed, and that the alternate requests
of the Appellant for either a new trial or for a direction
to the lower Court to fix damages be both denied.
Respectfully submitted,

C. N. OTTOSEN
Attorney for Respondent
65 East 4th South- Suite 201
Salt Lake City, Utah
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